⚖️ JUDICIAL 🔴 LAST MINUTE 📅 MAY 7, 2026

Supreme Court rejected the government's "per saltum" for the labor reform

The case will continue in lower instances, generating tension in the ruling party. Rosatti, Lorenzetti and Rosenkrantz signed the unanimous ruling that declared inadmissible the extraordinary appeal of the Attorney General's Office.

📘  What is per saltum and why did the government use it?

The per saltum – literally, 'leap of instance' in Latin – is an exceptional procedural mechanism that allows the Supreme Court to intervene directly in a judicial case without waiting for the usual route through the lower instances. It is, in other words, a legal shortcut enabled only in circumstances of extreme institutional urgency.

Article 257 bis of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure of the Nation establishes the requirements for its admissibility: that the case be processed under federal jurisdiction and that a 'notorious institutional gravity' is accredited. Both conditions must be met simultaneously. It is not enough to allege urgency or to maintain that the matter under discussion is of public importance.

❝  The per saltum is the last emergency tool of the Argentine judicial system. It is only enabled when the institutional gravity is manifest and the damage irreparable through ordinary channels.

In this case, the Attorney General's Office of the Treasury – the body that legally represents the national State – went to the per saltum on April 16, after the labor judge Raúl Horacio Ojeda of the National Labor Court No. 63 issued a precautionary measure that suspended the application of 82 articles of the labor reform. The Government argued that the situation was institutionally serious and asked the Court to rule without waiting for the exhaustion of ordinary remedies.

📋  The Court's ruling: what exactly it said

The text of the ruling is forceful and concise, as is usually the language of the highest court when it rejects an appeal in limine. The three judges who signed the resolution – Rosatti, Lorenzetti and Rosenkrantz – maintained:

The resolution was accompanied, according to judicial sources consulted by the main media, by an additional consideration: the Executive's request was also 'unofficial' since the labor reform was already in force at the time of the ruling. In effect, Chamber VIII of the National Labor Appeals Chamber had restored the full validity of the articles suspended on April 23, by granting suspensive effect to the appeal of the national State.

✅  Law 27.802 on Labor Modernization is currently IN FORCE. The Court considered that, given this context, the per saltum was additionally 'unofficial'.

From the procedural perspective, the Court's decision does not imply a substantive pronouncement on the constitutionality of the labor reform. The highest court did not evaluate whether or not the law is compatible with the National Constitution: it simply determined that the path chosen by the Government to access that definition – per saltum – did not meet the legal requirements to be admitted.

🕰️  Chronology of the conflict: from the sanction of the law to judicial rejection

To understand the scope of today's ruling, it is essential to reconstruct the procedural itinerary that led the Court to pronounce. The judicial saga of Law 27,802 is one of the most complex constitutional litigations of the year.

📜  Law 27.802: what reform and why did it generate so much controversy?

The Labor Modernization Law – published in the Official Gazette on March 6, 2026 – represents the most ambitious reform of Argentine labor law in decades. The text modifies the Employment Contract Law (No. 20,744), repeals the Telework Law and intervenes in more than thirty different regulations of the labor legal system.

Among its most controversial provisions are changes in the system of severance pay, modifications to union regulations, alterations to the social security system and the repeal of articles linked to the protection of the worker. From the Executive, the reform was presented as an instrument of deregulation necessary to generate employment and reduce labor litigation.

It was precisely this collision of arguments that led the CGT to file, days after the publication of the law, an action declaring unconstitutionality before the Labor Justice. The union, represented by its general secretaries Sola, Argüello and Jerónimo, maintained that the challenged articles modify the current labor regime and violate constitutional rights and guarantees.

⚖️  Judge Ojeda: the epicenter of the procedural dispute

Judge Raúl Horacio Ojeda, head of the National Labor Court No. 63, became the unexpected protagonist of this institutional conflict. On March 30, 2026, Ojeda accepted the precautionary measure requested by the CGT and suspended the questioned articles with general scope – a decision that set off alarms in the Casa Rosada and triggered the judicial strategy of the Executive.

Ojeda is a labor judge of first instance with a background in the Ministry of Labor during the Kirchner administration, where he served as chief adviser to then-Minister Juan Carlos Tomada. His profile was questioned by the ruling party, which pointed out alleged incompatibilities and sought to remove him from the file by questioning his competence to hear a case of these characteristics.

⚠️  Judge Ojeda resisted the orders of the Chamber to refer the file to the federal administrative litigation jurisdiction, a situation that forced the court to issue a peremptory order of 24 hours with authorization of non-working days.

The government's strategy to remove Ojeda was successful at the procedural level: the National Court of Appeals in Federal Administrative Litigation ruled that the case should be processed in its jurisdiction because it is a matter that exceeds classic labor law and involves the validity of a national law. The change of jurisdiction restricts the margin of action of the CGT, which had achieved its main judicial victory in the labor field.

👥  The actors in the conflict: who's who

📊  Political impact: a setback for the ruling party

The Court's decision was received in the ruling party as a new front of judicial tension, although government spokesmen tried to minimize its impact by pointing out that the labor reform remains fully in force. However, analysts and political operators agree that the rejection of the per saltum implies a relevant procedural defeat for the Executive.

❝  The Government loses the possibility of obtaining a quick and definitive definition from the Court. The legal uncertainty about the labour reform has been going on indefinitely.

The official strategy had a clear objective: to obtain from the Supreme Court a substantive definition that would shield the law against future judicial questions. When the per saltum is rejected, that objective is postponed and the case will have to go through the ordinary path – which can last for months or even years – before eventually reaching the highest court through the common route.

From the CGT, meanwhile, there was a nuanced reading. Sources from the labor federation told La Nacion that the highest court could have resolved the issue, and recalled that there are still pending pronouncements in the Labor Chamber, where the challenges of its members are being processed.

The Argentine Rural Society also has a presence in the litigation: it appeared before the courts to support the validity of Law 27,802 and request that its application not be suspended, showing the political-economic weight that the reform has for the business sector.

📍  Current status of the file: where we are today

With the per saltum rejected, the case is filed in the Federal Administrative Court No. 12, which must resolve the substance of the conflict: whether or not the challenged articles of Law 27,802 are compatible with the National Constitution. That resolution — which is expected to be appealed by any of the losing parties — could eventually reach the Supreme Court through the ordinary route.

Meanwhile, the labor reform is in force and employers and workers must adjust their relations to the new regulations, although with the uncertainty that the legal scenario could change if the federal court adopts a precautionary measure of suspension or orders the unconstitutionality of the questioned articles.

🧠  Legal analysis: what does the ruling really mean?

Beyond the immediate political result, the Court's ruling has legal implications that deserve a detailed analysis. Firstly, the highest court ratifies the exceptional nature of per saltum as a procedural tool: it is not enough that the case is important or that the Executive has an interest in a quick resolution. A 'notorious institutional gravity' is required, which, in this context, the judges considered that it was not duly accredited.

Second, the additional consideration of the 'inofficiousness' of the appeal reveals a pragmatic view: if the law was already in force at the time of ruling, the urgent basis that justifies the per saltum vanishes. The Court, in this sense, not only rejected the appeal for formal reasons, but also for reasons of procedural opportunity.

Third, it is relevant to note that the judgment was signed by only three of the five members of the Court. Judges Juan Carlos Maqueda and Ricardo Lorenzetti – the latter is a signatory – are the five members of the court. The absence of the signature of any of the justices may respond to reasons of recusal, excuse or simple coincidence of agenda, but it could be significant if the case eventually reaches the highest court through the ordinary route.

❝  The rejection of the per saltum does not define the constitutionality of the labor reform. It is a procedural defeat for the government, not a substantive defeat for the validity of Law 27,802.

🔮  What can happen from here on out? Possible scenarios

Scenario 1: The federal administrative jurisdiction rules in favor of constitutionality

If Federal Court No. 12 and eventually the Contentious Administrative Chamber validate the constitutionality of the law, the CGT could file an extraordinary appeal before the Supreme Court, which in that case would intervene through the ordinary channels. This scenario is the most favorable for the government.

Scenario 2: The federal jurisdiction issues a new suspensive injunction

Nothing prevents the new court hearing the case from issuing a new precautionary measure that suspends – again – the articles in question. In that case, the government could appeal again and the cycle would be repeated, although now in the federal jurisdiction.

Scenario 3: The CGT challenges the change of jurisdiction before the Court

The labor federation has already indicated that it raised the unconstitutionality of the law of precautionary measures against the State that empowered the Federal Court to resolve questions of jurisdiction. If that challenge succeeds, the file could return to the labor jurisdiction, reversing the procedural progress achieved by the Government.

Scenario 4: Out-of-court agreement between the Government and CGT

In the context of the parity negotiations and the political dynamics, a scenario of understanding that unlocks the conflict through legislative or regulatory modifications to the most controversial articles of the law cannot be ruled out.

❓  Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

❓  What is a per saltum in Argentine law?

Per saltum is an exceptional procedural remedy that allows the Supreme Court to intervene directly in a case without waiting for the exhaustion of intermediate instances. It is regulated in Article 257 bis of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure and only applies when there is 'notorious institutional gravity'. It is a tool of very restricted use in Argentine judicial practice.

❓  Why did the Court reject the government's per saltum?

The Court declared the appeal 'inadmissible' on the grounds that the requirements of Article 257 bis of the CPCCN were not met. Additionally, it pointed out that the request was 'unofficial' since Law 27,802 was already in force at the time of resolution, which made the urgent intervention that the Government demanded unnecessary.

❓  Is Law 27,802 on labor reform in force today?

Yes. The law has been fully in force since April 23, 2026, when Chamber VIII of the National Labor Appeals Chamber granted suspensive effect to the State's appeal, lifting Judge Ojeda's precautionary measure. The rejection of per saltum does not change this situation.

❓  What articles did the CGT question and why?

The CGT challenged more than 80 articles of the law that, according to the labor federation, modify the employment contract regime, union rules, the social security system and access to labor justice in a regressive manner. He argued that these changes violate the principle of progressivity of social rights and freedom of association, both with constitutional support.

❓  Who are the three judges who signed the ruling?

The ruling was signed by Horacio Rosatti (president of the Court), Ricardo Lorenzetti and Carlos Rosenkrantz. The three make up the Supreme Court and formed a unanimous decision in the rejection of the extraordinary appeal by leap of instance presented by the Attorney General's Office.

❓  What happens now with the case?

The file continues its processing in the Federal Administrative Court No. 12, which must resolve the substance of the conflict: whether or not the questioned articles of Law 27,802 are constitutional. That decision may be appealed and eventually reach the Supreme Court through the ordinary route.

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⚖️ A ruling that defines the pace of the case, not its final destination

The rejection of per saltum by the Supreme Court is not the end point of the judicial saga around Law 27,802. It is, rather, a sign that the highest court is not willing to be used as an express arbiter of disputes that still have a path in the lower instances. The labor reform is still in force, the CGT is not resigning its legal strategy, and the contentious-administrative jurisdiction will now have to bear the weight of a decision that will define the Argentine labor map in the coming years. The Court, meanwhile, waits.

Editorial illustration — RIGI • Incentive Regime for Large Investments • Law 27.742 • Argentina 2024–2026

  SPECIAL ANALYSIS • ECONOMY • INVESTMENT 

🏛️ WHAT IS RIGI

📅 May 2026 ⏱ Reading time: approx. 14 minutes 🇦🇷 Argentine Economy

Keywords: RIGI Argentina • Incentive Regime for Large Investments • Law 27742 • Law of Bases • foreign investment • Vaca Muerta • mining • VPU • fiscal stability 30 years • ICSID • tax benefits Argentina 2026

The Incentive Regime for Large Investments (RIGI) is a promotional program created by Articles 164 to 228 of Title VII of Law 27,742, sanctioned on June 28, 2024 and published in the Official Gazette on July 8, 2024. It is part of the so-called "Law of Bases and Starting Points for the Freedom of Argentines", the largest package of structural reforms of the government of Javier Milei. The RIGI was regulated by Decree 749/2024 (August 2024) and complemented by AFIP General Resolution 5590/2024 and Decree 940/2024. In February 2026, Decree 105/2026 extended the deadline for membership until 8 July 2027.

The logic of the RIGI is based on a clear diagnosis: Argentina has enormous potential in natural resources and energy – lithium, copper, oil, gas, renewables – but lacks the private investment to develop them at scale. The cost of capital in the country is prohibitively high due to the history of regulatory, exchange rate and tax instability. The RIGI seeks to "advance" macroeconomic solutions that under normal conditions would require decades, offering investors a predictable legal and fiscal environment for 30 years.

The backbone of the RIGI is the Single Project Vehicle (VPU). To access the regime, investors must constitute a legal entity whose sole and exclusive purpose is to carry out the approved project. The VPU can take the form of a commercial company, a branch of a foreign company, a temporary union (UTE) or other associative contracts. The rule is strict: the VPU cannot have assets or activities outside the project, except those strictly necessary for the administration of funds.

One variant is the "dedicated branch": a company already operating in Argentina can create a branch specific to the RIGI project, isolating those assets from the rest of its operations. This figure allows multinationals already established in the country to access the regime without dissolving their existing structure.

Once approved, the VPU enjoys all the benefits of the RIGI for the life of the project. If you fail to qualify, you may be discharged from the scheme and lose accrued benefits. The execution period varies depending on the project, but the law requires that at least 40% of the minimum investment required be made within the first two years of accession.

The RIGI offers the most extensive package of tax, customs and exchange benefits in recent Argentine history

💰 Tax Benefits

🚢 Customs Benefits

💱 Exchange Benefits

⚖️ Legal Stability: 30 Years of Fixed Rules

The benefit most valued by investors is not fiscal but legal: stability for 30 years. During this period, the State guarantees that:

1.      The VPU may not be affected by the repeal of the RIGI or by more burdensome regulations than those in force at the time of accession.

2.     The participating provinces and municipalities may not impose new local taxes, except for remuneration rates for services effectively rendered.

3.     In the event of a dispute, the investor can go directly to ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, World Bank), avoiding Argentine justice.

4.    If a future rule is more beneficial to the VPU, the VPU may choose to apply it in place of the original regime.

The RIGI was the most controversial point of the Basic Law: the debate between development and sovereignty is still open in 2026

The RIGI was, from its conception, the most debated and questioned chapter of the Basic Law. The critics come from very diverse spectrums: heterodox economists, environmental organizations such as Greenpeace, research foundations such as FUNDAR and FARN, SME unions, opposition legislators and even some sectors of the local business establishment. Their objections are articulated in four main axes.

💸 The Fiscal Impact Argument

Economist Martin Reydó (Fundar) argues that the RIGI represents "the core of the government's proposal" and warns that "tax benefits minimize tax revenues; in this way, an essential way for the exploitation of natural resources to benefit the Nation as a whole is sterilized."

The exact fiscal cost of RIGI has not been officially calculated or published. Private estimates vary widely depending on the projects that are actually developed. What is clear is that the difference between the general rate of Profits (35%) and that of the RIGI (25%) implies a tax "donation" of 10 percentage points on the profits of projects that, together, could exceed USD 60,000 million.

🌱 The Environmental Issue

Article 193 of the Basic Law establishes that inputs for strategic export projects must be guaranteed "regardless of whether it affects domestic supply." Cristian Fernández (FARN) warns: "If water is affected by mining projects and, suddenly, there is a context of drought, the water supply for the communities will not matter because the water will be given to the mining companies."

Greenpeace was even more categorical in its statement of June 13, 2024, warning that the RIGI does not impose prior environmental impact assessment conditions and does not guarantee consultation with local populations or indigenous peoples, which violates the National Constitution and the international treaties on environmental and indigenous rights signed by Argentina.

⚖️ The ICSID Problem

Direct access to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the World Bank's arbitral tribunal, is one of RIGI's most controversial points. Argentina already has a painful history with that court: after the 2001 crisis, it was ordered to pay millions of dollars to foreign investors. The fact that the RIGI enshrines direct access to ICSID by law – without going through Argentine judicial instances – is interpreted by critics as a cession of legal sovereignty over resources that are owned by the State.

As of May 2026: 12 projects approved for USD 25,479 M and others for USD 37,600 M under evaluation — total in portfolio: USD 63,079 M

As of May 2026, RIGI has 12 approved projects for a total of USD 25,479 million, with another 20 projects under evaluation that would add an additional USD 37,600 million. The total in the portfolio – approved plus under evaluation – exceeds USD 63,000 million, equivalent to approximately 9% of Argentina's GDP. According to the government, these projects will generate 36,873 direct and indirect jobs.

The sectoral distribution is revealing: 72-75% of the approved amounts correspond to energy and oil/gas, 24-26% to mining (lithium, copper, gold). Other sectors – industrial, logistics infrastructure – account for only 2-3% of the total. In terms of geography, San Juan leads in projected employment (12,939 positions), followed by Santa Fe (9,700 through the port of Timbúes) and Salta/Rio Negro.

The most advanced project under execution is the El Quemado Solar Park (Mendoza), which already injects energy into the national electricity system and will be the largest photovoltaic park in the country when it reaches 305 MW. The most ambitious in amount is Argentina LNG (USD 6,878 M), which would position the country as an exporter of liquefied natural gas for the first time in its history.

In February 2026, Decree 105/2026 extended the deadline for joining the RIGI for one year – from July 2026 to July 2027 – using the only extension allowed by law. The decree also expanded the sectoral scope of the regime to include the "exploitation and production of new developments of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons onshore," with a minimum investment of USD 600 million for those projects.

The Secretary of Mining, Luis Lucero, had anticipated at a sectoral event: "My personal recommendation will be to extend the RIGI, because it reflects the economic model to which we aspire: without withholdings, with lower taxes and agile procedures." The extension was interpreted by the market as a sign of continuity and solidity of the regime.

To size the RIGI package, it is convenient to compare it with the general tax regime that governs the rest of the companies in Argentina:

RIGI is, in essence, a high-risk bet with high-return potential. The risk is real: ceding part of the legal and fiscal sovereignty for 30 years in strategic sectors is a decision that commits the country far beyond the government that made it. The potential benefits are also real: if projects are executed as planned, Argentina could transform its balance of payments, generate tens of thousands of jobs, and finance a development process that would otherwise have taken decades.

The first year of the RIGI – with 12 projects approved and the first meters of pipeline installed in Vaca Muerta Sur – shows that the regime has the capacity to attract capital. But it also shows its limits: the almost exclusive concentration in energy and mining, the practically zero effect on industrial employment and the paradox of negative net FDI in the same period.

The debate will remain open as long as the RIGI is in force. What seems indisputable is that this is the most significant structural reform that Argentina has attempted in terms of attracting investment since the privatizations of the 1990s, with all the promises and all the risks that this comparison entails.

📚 Sources and References

5.     Infoleg — Decree 749/2024 • Regulation of RIGI (servicios.infoleg.gob.ar)

6.    Argentina.gob.ar — RIGI: from today, companies will be able to apply to the regime (October 2024)

7.     Argentine Embassy in Portugal — RIGI: Extension and modifications (February 2026)

8.    La Nación — RIGI projects are advancing: 10 initiatives for USD 25,479 M (January 2026)

9.    Infobae — The success of RIGI (December 2025) • Approved projects (December 2025)

10.  Canal26 — RIGI Effect: The 12 Projects and 36,000 Jobs (May 2026)

11.    Grant Thornton Argentina — RIGI: What You Need to Know (August 2024); One year after its regulation (December 2025)

12.   Profile — RIGI: the doubts generated by the most controversial point of the Bases Law (June 2024)

13.   TSS Agency — Impacts of RIGI, one year after its implementation (2025)

14.  Greenpeace Argentina — On the approval of the RIGI (June 2024)

15.   Shale24 — RIGI Final Map: Approved and Pending Projects 2026 (January 2026)

16.  NY Consulate (Chancellery) — RIGI Investor Guide (cnyor.cancilleria.gob.ar)

SEO: RIGI Argentina 2026 | Large Investment Incentive Scheme | Law 27742 | RIGI Benefits | VPU | foreign investment Argentina | Vaca Muerta | lithium | Mining | Fiscal stability 30 years | ICSID Argentina

⚡ ECONOMY  ·  PRIVATIZATIONS  ·  ENERGY

Argentina accelerates privatizations: aims for US$ 2,000 million in reserves

Transener, AySA and Belgrano Cargas, at the center of a plan promoted by Caputo that seeks to strengthen the Central Bank's reserves before the end of the year.

🗓️ May 2, 2026   ✍️ Economic Writing   ⏱️ Estimated reading time: 5 minutes

The National Executive Branch deepens its strategy of state disinvestment at a pivotal moment for the Argentine macroeconomy. With the goal of accumulating international reserves set in the agreement with the IMF as a backdrop, Economy Minister Luis Caputo presented an ambitious timetable that could add US$ 2,000 million before the end of 2026. The heart of the plan is three major operations: the sale of 50% of Citelec – controlling company of Transener – the 30-year concession of AySA and the total privatization of Belgrano Cargas y Logística.

The most advanced tender – and the one with the greatest immediate impact – is that of Citelec, the controlling company that groups 50% of the state-owned Transener and Transba, the two large high-voltage electricity carriers in the country. The opening of envelopes, which took place on Tuesday, April 29, revealed three proposals totaling almost US$ 890 million, with the following distribution:

The final decision on the award will fall to the Ministry of Finance. Private sector sources pointed out that the winning bid far exceeds initial estimates, which the government interprets as a sign of market confidence in the state reform process.

In parallel with the dispute over Transener, the Ministry of Economy took a fundamental regulatory step by approving, through Resolution 543/2026 of April 28, the concession contract and share transfer model of Agua y Saneamientos Argentinos (AySA). The operation reaches 51% of the company's state shares .

The approved scheme establishes that the concession will have a term of 30 years for the provision of drinking water and sewerage service in the City of Buenos Aires and 26 municipalities of the Buenos Aires metropolitan area, including La Matanza, Quilmes, Avellaneda and Lomas de Zamora, among others. The contractor must comply with the 2024-2026 Transition Plan until the end of the current year, which would guarantee the continuity of the service during the transfer stage.

📌 The tariff table and the minimum investment conditions will be defined in the bidding phase, whose call is expected for the second half of 2026.

The Executive also decreed the total privatization of Belgrano Cargas y Logística, the state-owned freight railway started in July 2025. Unlike the other processes, here the scheme contemplates separate tenders for tracks, workshops, locomotives and wagons, under an "open access" model  that would allow multiple operators to enter the system.

The Belgrano, San Martín and Urquiza lines will be tendered independently. According to the Infrastructure portfolio, there is already declared interest from agro-exporters, mining companies and at least one foreign investment group. The proceeds will go to rail infrastructure through a dedicated trust, designed to shield funds from discretionary use.

Privatizations are not an isolated phenomenon: they are a commitment made by Argentina when it signed an Extended Facilities program with the IMF in April 2025, with total disbursements projected at US$ 20,000 million. The agreement establishes strict goals for the accumulation of reserves, and one of the sources of financing envisaged is precisely the extraordinary income derived from the sale or concession of state assets.

Minister Caputo himself stressed that the divestment plan contributes to a broader objective of fiscal sustainability without resorting to the Central Bank's reserves. The consulting firm PwC remarked, in a recent report, that these revenues are key to sustaining fiscal balance in a context of reduced tax pressure.

The Bases Law, passed in July 2024, enabled the transfer of eight state-owned companies to the private sector. The plan started with the ambition of privatizing 41 companies, although only eight received legislative authorization. Here is the status of each one:

🟡 In active 🔵 process  Started / in preparation ⚪ Pending

The privatization program of Javier Milei's government presents a double-edged equation. On the one hand, the injection of private currency would relieve the pressure on the Central Bank's reserves without generating monetary issuance, a central argument in the official narrative. On the other hand, the speed of the process raises questions about the regulatory quality of the contracts and the capacity of the State to guarantee affordable rates for essential services such as drinking water.

The "open access" scheme  in Belgrano Cargas represents a commitment to competition between operators, although specialists in the sector warn that the fragmentation of the system could hinder operational coordination. In the case of AySA, the 30-year duration of the concession generates debates about tariff review mechanisms and the investments committed in sewage infrastructure.

In any case, political timing also matters: with the legislative elections of October 2025 already over and the agreement with the IMF as an umbrella of credibility, the Executive has a window of opportunity to move forward without the vetoes of Congress that stopped the original plan of 41 companies.

• Infobae – Argentina expects to obtain 2,000 million euros this year through privatizations

• MercoPress – Argentina expects to raise 2,000 million according to Caputo

• Context Tucumán – The Government accelerates privatizations to add reserves

• Diario El Paso – Caputo accelerates privatizations and bets on revenues of US$ 2,000 million

• National Executive Branch – TN.com.ar – Official coverage of the plan

⚠️ Editorial note: This article was prepared for informative and journalistic purposes based on verified public sources as of May 2, 2026. The figures may vary as the bidding process progresses.

For the first time in decades, the corridors of the Casa Rosada woke up without a journalistic presence. What began as a criminal complaint against two TN journalists led to the total closure of the historic Balcarce 50 Press Room, unleashing an institutional crisis unprecedented in Argentina's democratic history and an escalation that has already reached the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

On Sunday, April 19, the program "And tomorrow what?", hosted by Luciana Geuna and broadcast by the Todo Noticias (TN) signal, broadcast a report designed to portray the daily functioning of the Casa Rosada and the power dynamics between the sectors of the Government: those close to Karina Milei and those close to Santiago Caputo.

The chronicler Ignacio Salerno made the tour using smart glasses with a built-in camera. During the report, the journalist himself explained that he used this device so that viewers could see what a day inside the government palace is like. The video showed common corridors, classrooms, the office of Cabinet Chief Manuel Adorni and that of Eduardo "Lule" Menem, Karina Milei's bishop.

For the Government, this material constituted a violation of security regulations. The Military House maintained in its criminal complaint that the filming exposed surveillance systems, communication equipment and access control devices, providing intelligence on the President's movements. The judicial text invoked articles 222 and 223 of the Penal Code, which contemplate penalties of one to six years in prison for obtaining or revealing political or military secrets.

The government's reaction was immediate and of unprecedented forcefulness. On Thursday, April 24, without prior notice, the Ministry of Communication removed the fingerprints of around 60 accredited journalists from different national and international media from the biometric access system. The extensions to accreditations that had been in force since 2025 were suspended indefinitely.

President Javier Milei himself reacted through his account on the social network X with a message that set off alarms in newsrooms and press defense organizations: he described journalists as "disgusting garbage" and "criminals", and validated messages from libertarian accounts that affirmed that Argentines do not need a press room in the Casa Rosada. Milei described the closure of the room as an "excellent" measure. He later posted photos of journalists on his social networks, in what FOPEA described as an act of personal harassment.

The measure did not come out of nowhere: approximately three weeks before the total shutdown, the government had already withdrawn accreditations from journalists from C5N, A24, El Destape, Ámbito Financiero, Tiempo Argentino and Radio La Patriada, linking them to an alleged Russian intelligence operation in 2024. According to FOPEA, by the end of 2025, 67 journalists had lost permanent accreditations in the Casa Rosada.

On Thursday, April 23, the Argentine Journalism Forum (FOPEA) filed a formal complaint with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, addressed to the president of the IACHR, Edgar Stuardo Ralón Orellana. The document details that the official decision to disqualify press workers who cover the Executive Branch in a generalized manner violates international standards of freedom of expression.

The presentation was not an isolated movement. It gives continuity to the proposals that FOPEA initiated in November 2025 in Miami, during a public hearing of the Commission's 194th Session. At that time, the entity had already warned commissioners about the risks to journalism in Argentina. The IACHR had also received a complaint from the Association of Argentine Journalistic Entities (ADEPA) that same month for "censorship."

On Monday, April 27, the IACHR's Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression (SLR) made public its concern and urged the Argentine State to review the restriction, demanding that it be adjusted to inter-American standards. It is the first formal international response to the conflict and a diplomatic blow of relevance for the government.

The conflict between the government of Javier Milei and the press did not begin with TN's lenses. Since the inauguration of the president in December 2023, the tension has been escalating under various modalities: public attacks on the reputation of journalists, accusations that journalism is part of "the caste", the installation of the narrative that most journalism is corrupt and the selective withdrawal of accreditations.

In March 2024, Milei accused journalists of being infiltrated agents of Cuba and Venezuela. In the following months, selective restrictions and attacks on press workers during operations were recorded. By the end of 2025, according to FOPEA, 67 professionals had already lost their permanent accreditations at Casa Rosada.

The total closure of April 24, 2026 represents, according to the historical journalists of the government headquarters themselves, an unprecedented event in Argentine history, even in the face of the military dictatorship of 1976–1983. The head of FOPEA, Fernando Stanich, remarked that although pressures on the press have existed in different administrations, it had never been prohibited to enter the main area of operation of the Executive Branch by name and surname.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and its Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression have repeatedly established that the access of the press to government spaces is a basic condition for the exercise of freedom of expression and citizen control. Limiting such access across the board, without proportionate justification or reliance on reasonable security standards, constitutes an illegitimate restriction on the right to information.

FOPEA maintains that the Casa Rosada, as the seat of the country's political power, has the character of an institutional public space. Its closure to the press not only affects journalists but also directly affects the right of citizens to access information about government acts, a pillar of the democratic system recognized by the American Convention on Human Rights.

1. FOPEA — Official Communiqué: Complaint to the IACHR (Primary Source)

2. APF Digital — FOPEA denounces to the IACHR the ban on entry to the Casa Rosada

3. Profile — The government is keeping the press room closed and there is no sign of reversing the measure

4. Profile — Who are the two journalists denounced by the Military House?

5. El Economista — What the Casa Rosada report showed

6. The Capital Mar del Plata — FOPEA denounces the restriction of access to the IACHR

7. Report 24 — Repudiation of the government's authoritarian turn on journalism grows

8. LT3 — Information blackout at the Casa Rosada: FOPEA warns of unprecedented measure

9. BAE Negocios — The Military House denounced journalists for filming inside the Rosada

10. Cibercuba — Milei closes the Casa Rosada press room and sparks controversy

11. Portal Misiones — FOPEA's harsh defense of the government's ban

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